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!"stract
This paper considers a monopolist’s supply of outside paper money in a random-
matching model with divisible money and divisible goods. When binding supply
announcements are feasible, the revenue-maximizing policy is characterized by an
initial period where the monopolist initiates a currency reform which destroys the
value of any old currency, and then issues new money, which the issuer taxes thereafter
with a constant gross growth rate of money. It is shown that this policy is time-
consistent if the trading history of the issuer is public information and if money
demanders respond to the relevation of defection by playing autarky.
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( )ntroduction
This paper considers a monopolist’s revenue-maximizing supply of outside paper money
in a random-matching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities.1 Two
questions usually arise concerning the private supply of money (Cavalcanti and Wallace
1999a): Is it feasible and is it optimal? The feasibility question occurs because of the
time-inconsistency problem. In models of private money, it has been observed that in the
absence of binding money supply announcements, revenue-maximizing policies are time-
inconsistent thereby ruling out any unregulated private organization of the market for
outside money (Calvo 1978, Hellwig 1985, Taub 1985, White 1999). In this paper, I show
that, even in the absence of binding money supply announcements, a monetary equilibrium
with private supply of outside paper money can exist. Concerning the optimality question,
I show that any private organization of the market for outside money is suboptimal.
In the absence of binding policy announcements, the existence of a monetary equilibrium
relies on two prerequisites that rule out the time-inconsistency problem: public knowledge
of the monopolist’s trading history and the existence of credible punishment strategies.
Public knowledge of the issuer’s trading history is needed so that the issuer can be punished
in the future for actions he takes today. Credibility of punishment strategies is essential
to eliminate the monopolist’s desire to deviate from the announced policy. In the model,
if executed the punishment would eliminate any future prots of the monopolist thereby
enforcing time-consistent behavior of the monopolist. The notion that the market would
discipline private issuers of outside paper money goes back at least to von Hayek (1976, S.
1Outside money, as opposed to inside money, gives the bearer no legal claim against the issuer and,
therefore, the real value of outside money is exclusively determined by the expectations of its real value
in future transactions. Hellwig (1985, p. 566!) contains an excellent discussion of the characteristics of
outside and inside money.
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30) who conjectured that “the slightest suspicion that the issuer was abusing his position
when issuing money would lead to a depreciation of its value and would at once drive him
out of business. It would make him lose what might be an extremely protable kind of
business.”
The monetary equilibrium of the model is characterized as follows: Initially, the monop-
olist announces the entire sequence of future money supplies and then o!ers to exchange
the initial stock of money for real commodities. Agents accept the initial o!er because
there is no record, as yet, about the monopolist’s past play. In each subsequent period,
each agent accepts monetary exchanges (goods for money) from other agents and from the
monopolist if, and only if, the monopolist has not deviated from the announced nonbinding
money supply sequence. Thus, if any deviation occurs, each agent refuses to produce for
money today and, in fact, in the future. For each agent it is optimal to respond to the
revelation of defection by playing autarky if all other agents respond likewise. Accordingly,
the monopolist cannot gain by defection, and, therefore, the money demanders’ willingness
to accept money in the initial period is a best response.
The model of this paper is based on Shi’s (1997, 1999) random-matching model with
divisible money and divisible real commodities. In Shi’s model, the money supply is ex-
ogenously given; one contribution of this paper, therefore, is to endogenize the supply of
money in the random-matching model with divisible money. The paper is related to several
papers that study the private supply of money. Other random-matching models include
Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1999), Ritter (1995), and Williamson (1999). They all
study environments with !"#!$!%!&'( money. Nonrandom matching models include Calvo
(1978), Klein (1975), and Taub (1985).
Because of their treatment of the time-inconsistency problem, the models of Cavalcanti
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and Wallace (1999a) and Ritter (1995) are of special relevance for this paper. Cavalcanti
and Wallace (1999a) assume that trading histories of bankers, who issue distinguishable
!"%!#( monies, are public knowledge, and they show that this knowledge is su"cient to
rule out the time-inconsistency problem. They derive the incentive-feasible allocation that
maximizes the nonbanking sector’s welfare and show that this allocation requires note
issue and redemption by the bankers. In Ritter’s (1995) model a subset of the population
belongs to a coalition that issues at money. The sequence of money supplies is chosen
to maximize the coalition members’ discounted utility from trading with nonmembers.
He shows that the coalition is able to promise credibly to limit the issue of money if the
coalition’s involvement in the economy is su"ciently large and if its members are su"ciently
patient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 an adapted version of Shi’s
(1997, 1999) model is presented; Section 3 considers the monopolist’s revenue-maximizing
sequence of money supplies when binding money supply announcements are feasible and
when they are not feasible, and Section 4 concludes.
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/ 0emand
Money demand arises in the search-theoretic model of monetary exchange where money
is used to alleviate the double coincidence of real wants problem. The model builds on
Shi (1997, 1999), who extended the search-theoretic approach developed by Kiyotaki and
Wright (1991, 1993) to allow for divisible money and divisible goods. While in Shi’s model
the supply of money is exogenously given, this paper considers the supply decision of a
revenue-maximizing monopolist. Before discussing the monopolist’s supply decision, let
me describe Shi’s model. There are ! " 2 types of households and ! types of nonstorable
goods. Each type consists of a large number of households with measure 1#!. An arbitrary
household of type $ " ! is referred to as household $. Decision variables of household $
are denoted by lower-case letters. Capital-case letters denote other households’ variables,
which are taken as given by household $. Each household type is specialized in consumption
and production as follows: a household of type $produces commodity $+1 and consumes
commodity $ ($%& !), for $ ' 1% &&%!.
Households cannot commit to future actions, and each household’s trading history
with other households is private information to the household. Because ! " 2, these
assumptions rule out any barter exchange for optimizing agents. The only storable object
is a perfectly divisible and intrinsically useless object called money. A monetary exchange
is feasible if a household $ is matched with either a household $+ 1 or a household $# 1.
The probability of a single coincidence of real wants is ' $ 1#!.
Each household consists of a continuum of members normalized to one, who carry
out di!erent tasks but regard the household’s utility as the common objective. Household
members are grouped into money holders (buyers) and producers (sellers), each performing
one task at a time. A buyer attempts to exchange money for consumption goods, and
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a seller attempts to produce goods for money. The fraction of buyers is given by the
exogenous constant (.2 Time is discrete and household members are randomly matched
in pairs in each period where the probability that a seller meets an appropriate buyer (a
buyer of household $+1 who holds money) is '(, and the probability that a buyer meets
an appropriate seller is ' (1#().
At the beginning of each period, the household has )! units of money and chooses a
uniform consumption level for each member, *!, and the next period’s money stock, )!+1.
The household then divides evenly the money stock among its buyers so that each buyer
holds )!#( units of money in a match and species the trading strategies for its members.
After this, the agents are matched and carry out their exchanges according to the described
strategies. Thereafter, members bring back their receipts of goods and money, and each
member consumes *! units of goods. At the end of a period, the household receives money
transfer + ! and carries the stock )!+1 to ,+ 1.
Utility in a period is given by -**+ # ./ where * is the quantity of goods consumed, /
is the quantity of goods produced, and . is the marginal cost of production where . " 0.
The function - is dened on *0%%), is increasing, three times di!erentiable, and satises
- *0+ ' 0% -00 0 0, -0 *0+ '% and *-000 (*) " 2-00 (*).3 The household discounts future utility
with the discount factor 1 " (0% 1).
Denote 2! the household’s period ,+ 1 marginal value of money, discounted to period
,. For the sake of simplicity, assume that a buyer who meets an appropriate seller makes
a take-it-or-leave-it o!er to the seller, and the seller accepts it if made no worse o! by
2Shi (1997, 1999) also allows households to choose the fraction of buyers ! in each period. To focus
on the central issue of the paper, the problem of an optimal money supply sequence is examined when the
fraction of buyers is given.
3The last assumption guarantees uniqueness of the monopolist’s solution. This assumption, for example,
is satised by the utility function " (#) = #!, where 0 $ % $ 1.
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accepting. The take-it-or-leave-it o!er is the pair (3!% 4!), where 3! is the quantity of goods
produced by the seller for 4! units of money. If the seller accepts the o!er, the acquired
money balances 4! will add to the seller household’s money balances at the beginning of
period ,+ 1, whose value is !!4!. The cost associated with this trade is .3! and the seller
accepts the o!er if 4!!! & .3!. Thus, any optimal o!er satises
4!!! ' .3!. (1)
Because a buyer cannot exchange more money than he has, the o!er (3!% 4!) satises
4! ' )!#(. (2)
A household’s trading strategy consists of the pair (3!% 4!) for each buyer, and the
numbers 5! " {0% 1} and 5"! " {0% 1} for each seller. Given the o!er (6!%7!) by a buyer of
another household, the seller decides either to accept (5! ' 1) or to reject (5! ' 0). Sellers
also receive o!ers to produce for money from the monopolist (details are specied in the
next section), which the sellers accept (5"! ' 1) or reject (5
"
! ' 0). For each period, the
household chooses ()!+1#*!% 3!% 4!), and (5!% 5"! ) to solve the following maximizing problem:
$-.
!X
!=0
1! (- (*!)# 8!) (3)
subject to (1), (2), and
*! ' ' (1#()("!3! (4)
8! ' ' (1#()(.5!6! + 9 (5"! + !) (5)
)!+1 #)! ' 5"! + ! + ' (1#()(5!7! # ' (1#()("!4! (6)
)!+1 & 0
The variables taken as given in the above problem are the state variable )! and other
households’ choices. Inequality (4) species the household’s consumption. With probability
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' (1#(), a buyer meets an appropriate seller and he receives "!3! units of goods. Because
( is the measure of buyers per household, ' (1#()("!3! represents the total quantity
of consumption goods acquired by the household. Equation (5) species the household’s
cost of producing for other households and for the issuer. The rst term on the right-
hand side is the household’s cost of producing for other households. A seller meets with
probability '( an appropriate buyer and produces 5!6! units of goods at cost .5!6!.
As the fraction of sellers is (1#(), total cost for the household is ' (1#()(.5!6!.
The second term species the household’s cost of producing for the monopolist. If the
monopolist sells 5"! + ! units of additional currency to the household, total cost to the
household is 9 (5"! + !) (details are specied in the next section). In Shi’s (1997, 1999)
models, households receive additional money through lump-sum transfers. Accordingly in
Shi’s models 9 (5"! + !) ' 0 and 5
"
! ' 1. Inequality (6) species the law of motion of the
household’s money balance. The rst term on the right-hand side species the additional
currency the household acquires from the monopolist, the second term species sellers’
money receipts when selling goods, and the third term species buyers’ expenses when
exchanging money for goods.
To simplify the problem, note the following: First, inequality (6) must hold with equal-
ity if money is valued in the future. Second, inequality (4) holds with equality, given the
household’s preferences; therefore, *! can be substituted by the equality of (4) throughout
the problem. Third, by the equation (1), 4! can be substituted throughout the problem.
Fourth, the other households’ choices (6!% 7!) satisfy a condition similar to equation (1).
Thus, a household gets a nonnegative surplus when selling; therefore, 5! ' "! ' 1 in a
monetary equilibrium.4
4There exists a nonmonetary equilibrium with &" = !" = 0.
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After substituting *!, 4!, and 5!, the remaining choice is 3!. Let :! be the shadow
price of inequality (2), expressed in period-, utility. Then, if -0 (*!) '
$%(&!)
$&!
, the envelope
condition for )! and the rst order condition for 3! are as follows:
2! ' 1
¡
2!+1 + ' (1#():!+1
¢
(7)
-0 (*!) '
. (2! + :!)
!!
(8)
Equation (7) is the optimal condition for )!. It states that the marginal cost of ac-
quiring money today, 2!, equals the discounted marginal benet of money tomorrow, 2!+1,
plus the discounted marginal benet of relaxing future cash constraints, ' (1#():!+1.
Equation (8) states that, for a buyer in a desirable match, the marginal utility of con-
sumption must equal the opportunity cost of the amount of money that must be paid to
acquire additional goods. To buy another unit of a good, the buyer must give up '
!!
units
of money (see eq. (1)). Increasing the monetary payment has two costs to the buyer. He
gives up the future value of money 2! and he faces a tighter constraint (2). Together, 2!
and :! measure the marginal cost of obtaining a larger quantity of goods in exchange.
0e!nition ( ) %*++(,-!. +/"(,0-* (12!'!&-!2+ !% 0 %(12(".( /3 4/2%(4/'#5% .4/!.(%
()!+1% *!#3!% 4!% 5!)
!
!=06 ,4( !+7'!(# %40#/8 7-!.(% (2!% :!)
!
!=06 0"# /,4(- 4/2%(4/'#%5 .4/!.(%
%2.4 ,40,
9!: ;!$(" /,4(- 4/2%(4/'#%5 .4/!.(% 0"# %40#/8 7-!.(%6 (0.4 4/2%(4/'#5% .4/!.(% %/'$( ,4(
#*"0+!. 7-/;-0++!"; 7-/&'(+ 9<:=
9!!: .4/!.(% 0"# %40#/8 7-!.(% 0-( ,4( %0+( 0.-/%% 4/2%(4/'#%=
9!!!: + ! ' )!+1 #)! ' (; # 1))!6 ; " 0>
The rst part of the denition requires that each household choose a best response
against other household choices. Part (ii) states that the equilibrium is a symmetric solu-
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tion to such best response correspondences, and part (iii) species the exogenously given
sequence of money supplies, where ; is the gross growth rate of money. In a symmetric
equilibrium, lower-case variables equal capital-case variables and are replaced by the corre-
sponding capital-case variables. Then, equations (7) and (8) give a single condition, which
the monopolist takes into account when choosing the sequence of money supplies:
!! ' 1!!+1
µ
1 + ' (1#() -
0 (*!+1)# .
.
¶
(9)
If the gross growth rate of money is constant (see Shi 1997, 1999), the equilibrium
quantity produced in a single-coincidence meeting is the value of 6 that solves
-0 (' (1#()(6) ' .
µ
' (1#() + ;#1 # 1
' (1#()
¶
. (10)
Denote this value by 6". Then in a symmetric monetary equilibrium, in each period
the buyers make the o!er (6"%7"! ), which the sellers accept. In this model, money is
neutral as the nominal quantity of money does not a!ect real production. However, money
is not superneutral. This can be seen from equation (10), which implies that 6" is strictly
decreasing in ;.
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3 Su55l7
Money is o!ered to the households by a single issuer. The issuer consists of a large number
of members called money agents, and the number of members is such that the issuer can
assign one member to each seller of each household. Members’ preferences for goods are
symmetric among goods and satisfy - *6"+ ' 6", where 6" is the quantity of goods con-
sumed. Money agents cannot produce real commodities; rather, they have the technology
that permits them to create at no cost, a divisible, durable, and intrinsically useless object
called money. Money agents cannot produce real commodities, so no note redemption by
the monopolist is feasible. As in Ritter (1995), the sequence of money supplies is chosen
to maximize the organization’s joint discounted utility from trading with nonmembers.
Because all money agents are identical and their preferences are linear, this is equal to
maximizing the expected discounted utility of a representative money agent.
8indin9 announcements I rst consider the utility-maximizing policy when binding
announcements are feasible and, thereafter, I consider nonbinding supply announcements.
In each case each period is divided into two subperiods. At the beginning of a period,
household members meet randomly in pairs and carry out their trades; at the end of a
period, the issuer assigns one member to each seller of each household, and each money
agent makes the same take-it-or-leave-it o!er (6"! % 7
"
! ), where 6
"
! is the quantity of goods
produced by the seller for 7"! units of money. In the initial period, , ' 0, the monopolist
announces the entire sequence of o!ers {6"! %7"! }!!=0 and households choose their trading
strategies. After the announcement the money agents sell the initial stock of nominal
balances to the households through the o!ers (6"0 %7
"
0 ).
Given a sequence of o!ers {6"! % 7"! }!!=0, the expected discounted lifetime utility of
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a money agent is
P!
!=0 1
!6"! . The analysis is simplied by noting that controlling this
sequence is equivalent to controlling the sequence of nominal money supplies {<!}!!=1.5 To
see this, note that if a seller accepts the o!er (6"! %7
"
! ), the acquired money balances 7
"
!
will add to the household’s money balances at the beginning of period , + 1, whose real
value is !!7"! . The cost associated with this trade is .6
"
! , and the household’s surplus
is !!7"! # .6"! . The seller accepts the o!er if !!7"! & .6"! . Thus, any optimal o!er
satises
!!7
"
! ' .6
"
! . (11)
Given (11), the lifetime utility of a money agent can be expressed as
P!
!=0 .
#11!!!7"! .
If money agents o!er (6"! % 7
"
! ), households acquire <!+1 #<! ' (1 # ()7"! units of
additional currency in each period. Accordingly, the monopolist’s problem (thereafter
called =<) is to choose the sequence of nominal money supplies {<!}!!=1 that maximizes
!X
!=0
.#1 (1#()#1 1! (<!+1 #<!)!! (12)
subject to the demand conditions (9), and
<!+1 #<! & 0. (13)
Several comments are in order here. First, inequality (13) expresses the fact that money
agents cannot produce real commodities and, therefore, cannot redeem money. Second, the
sequence of real revenues {(<!+1 #<!)!!}!!=0 is homogenous of degree zero in the sequence
{<!}!!=1. Thus, a proportional change in the money supply sequence has no e!ect on the
5Throughout the paper I focus on symmetric equilibria where all households are treated equaly that is,
each household receives the same take-it-or-leave-it o!ers. Note, however, deviations from such a policy
may involve asymmetric o!ers. Given this, if all households are treated symmetrically, the control of the
sequence of take-it-or-leave-it o!ers is equivalent to the control of the sequence of money supplies {'"}""=1,
which in equilibrium equals the sequence of the stocks of money held by each household, {("}""=1.
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sequence of real revenues. This is a consequence of the neutrality of money, which is a
property of Shi’s (1997, 1999) divisible money model used here. Third, and related to
the previous point, if a sequence {<!}!!=1 solves =< , any sequence {><!}!!=1, > " 0, is a
solution to =< .
Finally, =< can be further simplied by noting that the control of {<!}!!=1 is equivalent
to the control of the sequence of households’ consumption {*!}!!=0. To see this, multiply
equation (9) by <!+1 to get
<!+1!! ' 1<!+1!!+1
µ
1 + ' (1#() -
0 (*!+1)# .
.
¶
and substitute this expression into the monopolist’s objective function. This and equation
(1) yield the modied objective
!X
!=0
1!
' (1#()2
·
1*!+1
µ
1 + ' (1#() -
0 (*!+1)# .
.
¶
# *!
¸
(14)
Maximization of (14) with respect to consumption *! yields the rst-order conditions
*! ' 0, , ' 0 (15)
-0 (*!) + *!-00 (*!) ' ., , " 0 (16)
According to equation (15), in the initial period, the monopolist destroys the value of
any old currency (*0 ' 0) and issues a new money.6 Thereafter, by equation (16), the issuer
earns seigniorage income by taxing (by selling additional units of money) the outstanding
stock of money by a constant gross growth rate of money, ;. To derive ;, denote *! the
value of *! that solves equation (16) and note that (16) implies that *! ' * is constant. If
6Without a medium of exchange ('0 = 0) households do not consume in the initial period because they
cannot trade. Although '0 = 0 is the maintained assumption, I have set up a more general maximization
problem which allows for '0 ) 0. If '0 ) 0, the optimal policy is to make the initial stock of money
worthless (e.g., by announcing to sell an innite amount of the old money) and then to issue a new money.
13
*! is constant, the households’ rst-order condition (9) implies that ;! ' ; where ; is the
value of ; that solves
-0 (*) ' .
µ
' (1#() + ;#1 # 1
' (1#()
¶
. (17)
Next, note that by (16) -0 (*) " ., which by (17) implies that ; " 1. Shi (1997) shows
that the Friedman rule (i.e., ; ' 1) maximizes the utility of the households. Thus, not
surprisingly, the monopolist’s desire for seignorage income induces him to have too much
ination from the households’ point of view. For certain parameter values, the solutions to
the rst-order conditions (16) and equation (17) involve deation, which violates condition
(13).7 Proposition 1, which takes this condition into account, characterizes the revenue-
maximizing policy of the monopolist when binding announcements are feasible.
Pro5osition ( ?4(-( (@!%,% 0 .-!,!.0' $0'2( 116 #(!"(# !" ,4( 7-//36 %2.4 ,40, ,4( 3/''/8!";
!% ,-2(A B3 1 & 116 ,4( %(12(".( {*"0 ' 0% *"! ' *}!!=1 %/'$(% CD 84(-( * !% ,4( $0'2( /3 * ,40,
%/'$(% 9E6:> B3 1 0 116 =< !% %/'$(# &* ,4( %(12(".( {*"0 ' 0% *"! ' e*}!!=1 84(-( e* !% #(!"(#
!" ,4( 7-//3> B" ,(-+% /3 ,4( 0%%/.!0,(# %(12(".( /3 +/"(* %277'!(% !3 1 & 116 ,4( %(12(".(
{<"! ' ;!#1<1}!!=1 %/'$(% =< 84(-( ; !% ,4( $0'2( /3 ; ,40, %/'$(% 9EG: 0"# <1 " 0
!% %/+( 0-&!,-0-!'* .4/%(" !"!,!0' 120",!,* /3 "/+!"0' +/"(*> B3 1 0 116 ,4( %(12(".(
{<"! '<1}!!=1 %/'$(% =< 84(-( <1 " 0 !% 0;0!" %/+( 0-&!,-0-!'* .4/%(" !"!,!0' 120",!,*
/3 "/+!"0' +/"(*>
Proof: Note, rst, that condition (13) is nonbinding if
(-0 (*)# .) ' (1#() & . (1# 1)1#1 (18)
7Deation is more likely the atter the curvature of the utility function. Note further that * is increasing
in +, in the single coincidence probability ,, and in the fraction of sellers, 1#!.
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Next, note that the right-hand side of (18) is strictly decreasing in 1, that the left-
hand side does not depend on 1, and that the solution to the second rst-order con-
dition is independent of 1. Thus, for any * there exists a critical value 11 such that
(-0 (*)# .) ' (1#() ' . (1# 11)1#11 . Therefore, if 1 & 11, inequality (13) is non-
binding and the sequence {*"0 ' 0% *"! ' *}!!=1 satises the rst-order conditions (15) and
(16). The second-order condition for a maximum is satised because of the assumption
-00 (*) 2 0 *-000 (*) imposed on the curvature of the utility function. Thus, if 1 & 11, the
sequence {*"0 ' 0% *"! ' *}!!=1 solves =< .
If 1 0 11, inequality (13) is binding. As the rst-order condition (16) is strictly
decreasing in *, the optimal policy in this situation is *! ' e*, for , " 0, where e* is the value
of * that satises (18) at equality. Thus, if 1 0 11, the sequence {*"0 ' 0% *"! ' e*}!!=1 solves
=< . The associated sequences of money supplies {<"! ' ;!#1<1}!!=1 and {<"! ' <1}!!=1,
respectively, are implied by equation (17). This completes the proof. ¥
According to Proposition 1, the sequence of money supplies {<"! }!!=1 maximizes the
expected lifetime utilities of money agents. From this sequence, the optimal sequence of
take-it-or-leave-it o!ers {6""! % 7""! }!!=0 can be derived. The optimal sequence of money
o!ered to the sellers in a match is½
7""0 '
<"1
1#(%7
""
! '
(;" # 1)<"!
1#(
¾!
!=1
(19)
where ;" ' ; if 1 & 11 and ;" ' 1 if 1 0 11 and the optimal sequence of real commodities
demanded from the sellers is½
6""0 '
*";"
' (1#()2 % 6
""
! '
*" (;" # 1)
' (1#()2
¾!
!=1
(20)
where *" ' * if 1 & 11 and *" ' e* if 1 0 11. To derive the optimal sequence of quantities
{6""! }!!=0, note that equation (1) implies that the sequence of shadow prices associated
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with the sequence {<"! }!!=1 is
n
!"0 '
'&!(!
)(1#*)+!! , !
"
! '
'&!
)(1#*)+!!
o!
!=1
. From this use (11) to
derive the sequence {6""! }!!=0.
Non"indin9 announcements The time-inconsistency problem (possibly) associated
with the optimal sequences {<"! }!!=1 is most clear if the optimal policy calls for a con-
stant money supply. With zero money growth, money agents consume 6""0 units of real
commodities initially and nothing thereafter. From the perspective of the initial period,
this may be a good policy because zero ination increases consumption today. From the
perspective of the following period, initial consumption no longer enters the monopolist’s
considerations and the monopolist would like to sell additional money. Because of the
monopolist’s #(%!-( to deviate from the announced policy, many economists (e.g., Calvo
(1978), Taub (1985), Hellwig (1985), and White (1999)) conclude that when no binding an-
nouncement are feasible, revenue-maximizing policies are time-inconsistent and this rules
out any unregulated private organization of a market for outside paper money (Hellwig
1985 p. 581).8
The problem with this conclusion is that without specifying the demand for money after
each possible history of the game, the question of whether the announced sequence of money
supplies {<"! }!!=1 is time-consistent or time-inconsistent cannot be answered. Knowledge
of the demand for money after each possible history is crucial because this determines
the monopolist’s expected stream of future revenues after each possible deviation.9 To
8Calvo (1978) was rst to point out the time-inconsistency problem of a revenue-maximizing money
supply sequence. The optimal solution {'!" }""=1 is time-consistent if for any -0, ., and - & -0 + .,
'!" (-0 + .) ='!" (-0). That is, the optimal solution is time-consistent if what is optimal to do in period
- from the vantage point of -0 is also optimal when the point of departure is -0 + . (see Calvo (1978) for
this denition).
9At an abstract level, it should not be surprising that the monopolist’s desire to deviate depends
essentially on her expectation of the demand for money following any deviation. However, to my knowledge,
with the exception of Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a and 1999b), the demand for money after out-of-
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construct a monetary equilibrium, however, it is not necessary to describe the entire game
in detail; it is su"cient to show that a credible punishment strategy exists which eliminate
the monopolist’s desire to deviate from the announced policy.
For this purpose, denote #" ' {6""! %7""! }!!=0 the announced optimal sequence of
take-it-or-leave-it o!ers dened by equations (19) and (20). To construct punishment
strategies, assume that the monopolist’s trading history is public information and let ?!
denote the monopolist’s trading history, where ?! contains each take-it-or-leave-it o!er the
monopolist has made up to time , # 1.10 Furthermore, let ?"! denote the history of o!ers
associated with the announced policy #" and consider the history-dependent strategy $", '¡
)"!+1% *
"
! % 3
"
! % 4
"
! % 5
"
! % 5
""
!
¢!
!=0
where )"!+1, *
"
! , 3
"
! , and 4
"
! solve the representative household’s
maximization problem described in Section 2, given the announced policy #", and 5"! and
5""! are dened as follows:
5"! '
(
1 if ?! ' ?
"
! and 7!2! & .6!
0 otherwise
(21)
5""! '
(
1 if ?! ' ?
"
! and {6"! % 7"! } ' {6""! % 7""! }
0 otherwise
(22)
The acceptance rule (21) species a seller’s behavior when matched with a buyer who
makes the take-it-or-leave-it o!er {6!% 7!}. The seller accepts the o!er if the monopolist’s
trading history, ?!, coincides with ?
"
! , and if the surplus 7!2! # .6! is nonnegative. The
acceptance rule (22) species a seller’s behavior when matched with a money agent who
equilibrium moves has, as yet, not been studied in detail. The details of the demand for money are also
important to determine quantitively how much the time-inconsistency problem accounts for periods of
high ination in countries with poorly designed monetary institutions. This question has been addressed
by Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (1999).
10In a more realistic information structure, the monopolist’s past play would be revealed with a random
delay. For example, one could assume that each period the public record of the monopolist’s past transac-
tions is updated with probability / and that there is no updating with probability 1#/. This implies that
the average updating lag is 10/ periods. Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) use this information structure
in a model where the past play of each agent is recorded with a random lag.
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makes the take-it-or-leave-it o!er {6"! %7"! }. Again, the seller accepts the o!er if the
monopolist’s trading history coincides with the announced plan, and if the monopolist
makes the equilibrium o!er {6""! % 7""! }. To proceed let $" denote the strategy prole
consisting of each household’s strategy $", and let h#"%$"i denote the strategy prole
consisting of the sequence of take-it-or-leave-it-o!ers #" and $".11
Pro5osition / ?4( %,-0,(;* 7-/!'( h#"%$"i !% 0 %2&;0+( 7(-3(., +/"(,0-* (12!'!&-!2+>
Proof: By applying the one-shot deviation principle, I rst show that the strategy
prole h#"%$"i is a Nash equilibrium. First, consider any period , " 0. If 1 " 11, the best
response of the monopolist against $" is {6"! % 7"! } ' {6""! %7""! } because {6"! %7"! } 6'
{6""! %7""! } yields zero revenue, not only in period ,, but in any of the following periods,
and {6"! % 7"! } ' {6""! % 7""! } yields a positive revenue, not only in period ,, but in any of
the subsequent periods. If 1 ' 11, it is weakly optimal to chose {6"! % 7"! } ' {6""! % 7""! }
against $" because any deviation as well as the equilibrium strategy yields zero revenue
today and in the future. Thus, {6"! %7"! } ' {6""! %7""! }, , " 0, is a best response against
$". Next, consider the best response in some period , " 0 of the representative household $
against the strategy prole
!
#"%$"#,
®
where $"#, denotes the strategy prole consisting of
the equilibrium strategies of all other households. If all other households accept monetary
exchanges and the monopolist’s strategy is #", then it is a best response to accept money
in exchange for real commodities at date ,. Therefore, neither the monopolist nor the
household has a protable deviation in any period , " 0. Next, consider the initial period.
Given $", the solution to the monopolist’s maximization problem PM implies that #" is a
11Note that h"!1#!i is not a strategy prole in a strict sense because it does not specify the monopolist’s
and households’ actions if they observe an out-of-equilibrium move of a single household. However, because
the measure of a single household is zero and, therefore, deviations of a single household are irrelevant, I
ignore deviations of households and focus on out-of-equilibrium moves of the monopolist.
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best response against $" and, by the same reasoning as above, $", is a best response against!
#"%$"#,
®
. Thus, I conclude that the strategy prole h#"%$"i is a Nash equilibrium.
Next, I show that the strategy prole h#"%$"i is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
While doing so, I focus on out-of-equilibrium moves of the monopolist because the measure
of a single household is zero and, therefore, deviations of a single household are irrelevant.
Consider any out-of-equilibrium move {6"! % 7"! } 6' {6""! %7""! } at some date , " 0. If
{6"! % 7"! } 6' {6""! %7""! }, all households reject money subsequently. Thus, the subgame
that starts in the period following this deviation is the autarky equilibrium, and it is well
known that the autarky equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of this subgame, in fact, of
any subgame, including the whole game. If other households do not accept money, the
best response for household $ is not to accept money. Moreover, this best response is
independent of the nature of the deviation of the monopolist. ¥
Four comments are required here. First, any deviation by the monopolist triggers
complete autarky. That is, every seller in every subsequent meeting refuses to produce for
money. For each household it is optimal to respond to the revelation of defection by playing
autarky if all other agents respond likewise. Second, if 1 " 11, it is strictly optimal for
the monopolist to adhere to the announced policy because she can sell additional money
in each period. If 1 ' 11, it is weakly optimal to adhere to the announced policy because
the monopolist is indi!erent between adhering to the announced plan and any deviation.
Third, if the monopolist’s makes an deviating o!er that yields a strictly positive surplus
to the seller’s household at today’s value of money, it is optimal for the seller not to accept
the o!er because of the household’s belief that he cannot buy anything with the additional
money in the future. Fourth, household must revert to complete autarky whenever the
monopolist deviates. Households cannot just stop trading with the monopolist because
19
each household would have an incentive to deviate from such a punishment strategy by
accepting additional money from the monopolist.
< Summar7
This paper considers a monopolist’s revenue-maximizing supply of outside paper money
in a random-matching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities. When
binding announcements are feasible, the monopolist’s policy is characterized by an initial
period where she initiates a currency reform which destroys the value of any old currency,
and then issues new money, which she taxes by a constant gross growth rate of money.
The paper shows that even in the absence of binding policy announcements, this
revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent. The time-consistency of the monopolist’s
policy relies on the public’s knowledge of the issuer’s trading history and on the existence
of a credible punishment strategy. The punishment strategy involves complete autarky
that is, each seller in every meeting refuses to produce for money. The punishment is
credible because for each household it is optimal to play autarky if all other household
respond likewise.
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